

WAYNE WRIGHT

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ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS

Assistant Professor (tenure-track)

University of California, Irvine – Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science
Fall 2008 – Present

Assistant Professor (early tenure and promotion awarded prior to AY 2008-2009)

California State University, Long Beach – Department of Philosophy
Fall 2005 – Spring 2008
On leave AY 2008-2009

Visiting Fellow

University of California, Irvine – Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science
Fall 2006 – Spring 2007

Visiting Lecturer

Washington University in St. Louis – Department of Philosophy
Fall 2003 – Spring 2005

AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology

AREAS OF COMPETENCE

Epistemology, Kant, Metaphysics, Modern Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

PUBLICATIONS

Refereed Publications

“Reply to Philipona and O’Regan” (w/ Kent Johnson), *Visual Neuroscience* 25 (March 2008): 221-224.

“Why naturalize consciousness?” *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 45 (Winter 2007): 583-607.

“Explanation and the hard problem,” *Philosophical Studies* 132 (January 2007): 301-330.

“Visual stuff and active vision,” *Philosophical Psychology* 19 (April 2006): 129-149.

“Colors as properties of the special sciences” (w/ Kent Johnson), *Erkenntnis* 64 (March 2006): 139-168.

“Distracted drivers and unattended experience,” *Synthese* 144 (March I 2005): 41-68.

“Projectivist representationalism and color,” *Philosophical Psychology* 16 (December 2003): 515-533.

“A dilemma for Jackson and Pargetter’s account of color,” *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 41 (Spring 2003): 125-142.

“McDowell, demonstrative concepts, and nonconceptual representational content,” *Disputatio* 14 (May 2003): 37-51.

“Fodor’s epistemic intuitions of analyticity,” *Sorites* 14 (October 2002): 110-116.

Invited Contributions and Reviews

“Enactivism's Vision: Neurocognitive Basis or Neurocognitively Baseless?” (w/ Charles Wallis), to appear in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience* (scheduled for publication in late 2008).

Review of Stephen Schiffer's *The Things We Mean*, *Disputatio* 18 (May 2005): 191-197.

PRESENTATIONS

Refereed Submissions

- "Opponent processing and the physical basis of color," at the 2008 Meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology
- “Perceptual externalism, color, and realism,” at the 2007 Meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology
- “Colors as properties of the special sciences,” (w/ Kent Johnson) at the 2004 APA Pacific Division Meeting and at the 2003 Meeting of the Illinois Philosophical Association
- “Transparency and aspects,” at the 2004 Meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology
- “Projectivist representationalism and color,” at the 2003 Midsouth Philosophy Conference and at the 2002 Meeting of the Illinois Philosophical Association
- “A dilemma for Jackson and Pargetter's account of color,” at the 1999 Rutgers University Graduate Philosophy Conference and at the 1998 Meeting of the Central States Philosophical Association
- “Fodor's epistemic intuitions of analyticity,” at the 1998 Rutgers University Graduate Philosophy Conference
- “Individualism, behavior, and Marr's theory of vision,” at the 1997 Meeting of the Central States Philosophical Association
- “Tye, tree-rings, and representation,” at the 1997 Syracuse University Graduate Philosophy Conference
- “Kant's B-Deduction as a diptych,” at the 1996 Meeting of the Central States Philosophical Association
- "Arguments of the B-Deduction: Objective validity and objective reality," at the 1995 Meeting of the Florida Philosophical Association

Invited Talks

- “A hazard of looking to the world to explain color phenomena: the seductive appeal of *argument ad pictorium*,” for the Horizons of Vision Research Conference at California State University, Long Beach (March 2008)
- “Perception, color, and realism,” for the Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science Colloquium Series at the University of California, Irvine (October 2006) and for the Department of Philosophy Colloquium Series at California State University, Long Beach (October 2006)
- “Naturalization and the science of consciousness,” for the Department of Philosophy Colloquium Series at California State University, Long Beach (May 2006)
- Comments on Robert Lurz's “Wordless thoughts and their supposed limits,” at the 2006 APA Pacific Division Meeting
- “On the extrascientific nature of the metaphysics of consciousness,” for the Works in Progress Program at Washington University in St. Louis (October 2004)
- “Attention and phenomenal consciousness,” for the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Medical School Program at Washington University in St. Louis (December 2003)

“Intentional inexistents and externalist representationalism,” for the Works in Progress Program at Washington University in St. Louis (September 2003)
“Colors as properties of the special sciences,” (w/ Kent Johnson) for the Works in Progress Program at Washington University in St. Louis (August 2003)

EDUCATION

Ph.D., Philosophy, Temple University, August 1999
Dissertation: *The Nonconceptual Representational Content of Perceptual Experience*
Committee: Michael Tye (Chair), Gerald Vision, David Welker, Abraham Witonsky

M.A., Philosophy, University of Florida, May 1996
Thesis: “The Two Arguments of Kant’s B-Deduction”
Committee: Kirk Ludwig (Chair), John Biro, Chuang Liu

B.A., Philosophy, Hofstra University, May 1993
Honors Thesis: “Kant, Stroud, and Skepticism”
Committee: Terry Godlove (Chair), Robert Holland, Elliot Jurist

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS

“Reply to Philipona and O’Regan” (w/ Kent Johnson), *Visual Neuroscience* (forthcoming)

This paper responds to Philipona & O’Regan (2006), which attempts to account for certain color phenomena by appeal to singularities in the space of “accessible information” in the light striking the retina. Three points are discussed. First, it is unclear what the empirical significance/import is of the mathematical analysis of the data regarding the accessible information in the light. Second, the singularity index employed in the study is both mathematically and empirically faulty. Third, the connection drawn between their findings and some data from the World Color Survey is lacking in quantitative analysis in places where it is needed. The difficulties raised prevent Philipona & O’Regan’s conclusions from being accepted.

“Why naturalize consciousness?” *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* (forthcoming)

This paper examines the relevance of philosophical work on consciousness to its scientific study. Of particular concern is the debate over whether consciousness can be naturalized, which is typically taken to have consequences for the prospects for its scientific investigation. It is not at all clear that philosophers of consciousness have properly identified and evaluated the assumptions about scientific activity made by both naturalization and anti-naturalization projects. I argue that there is good reason to think that some of the assumptions about physicalism and explanation made by the parties to the debate are open to serious doubt. Thus this paper is an invitation for those inquiring into whether consciousness can be naturalized to more carefully consider the expected payoff of such efforts.

“Explanation and the hard problem,” *Philosophical Studies* 132 (January 2007): 301-330

This paper examines the form of explanation at issue in the hard problem of consciousness and argues that it is scientifically irrelevant. Thus it is concluded that the hard problem is an extrascientific matter, despite appearances to the contrary. In particular, it is argued that the ‘sense of understanding’ that is implicated in the hard problem provides neither a necessary

nor a sufficient condition on satisfactory scientific explanation. Considerations of the actual tools and methods available to scientists are used to make the case against it being a necessary condition, and work by J.D. Trout that exploits psychological research on the hindsight and overconfidence biases is used to show that it is not a sufficient condition. It is argued, however, that certain intellectual and moral concerns give us good reason to still try to meet the hard problem's explanatory challenge, despite its extrascientific nature.

“Visual stuff and active vision,” *Philosophical Psychology* 19 (April 2006): 129-149

This paper examines the status of unattended visual stimuli in the light of recent work on the role of attention in visual perception. Although the question of whether attention is required for visual experience seems very interesting, this paper argues that there currently is no good reason to take a stand on the issue. Moreover, it is argued that much of the allure of that question stems from a continued attachment to the defective ‘inner picture view’ of experience and a mistaken notion that the ultimate goal of vision is to produce visual experience. The paper examines a promising general account of the content and structure of vision and presents reasons for not taking that account to be committed to any substantive claims about the experiential status of unattended visual stimuli. Also addressed are the active nature of vision and the role of vision in enabling our ecological success. These considerations highlight that visual experience is not the whole of vision and that a much more important question about unattended visual stimuli than whether they are consciously experienced is what contribution they make to how we interact with the world.

“Colors as properties of the special sciences” (w/ Kent Johnson), *Erkenntnis* 64 (March 2006): 139-168

We examine the pros and cons of color realism, exposing some desiderata on a theory of color: the theory should render colors as scientifically legitimate and correctly individuated, and it should explain how we have veridical color experiences. We then show that these desiderata can be met by treating colors as properties of the special sciences. According to our view, some of the major disputes in the color literature—anti-realism vs. dispositionalism vs. reductionism—are not well-founded at this stage of scientific inquiry. Our account is designed to be of use in the sciences and as such is driven largely by considerations of what the various sciences need in order to proceed appropriately. We argue that a scientific theory of colors needn't regard colors as anything more than high-level statistical constructs built out of correlations between color experiences and other phenomena.

ABSTRACT OF MANUSCRIPT UNDER JOURNAL REVIEW

“Perception, color, and realism”

A major reason philosophers have addressed the issue of color realism is its apparent relevance to perception theory. An account of the nature of color should tell us what, if anything, we see when we are subject to color experiences. Thus resolving the color realism debate is expected to make a foundational contribution to the sciences that are concerned with color phenomena. This paper argues that the traditional debate over color realism, at least with respect to its supposed relevance to scientific research, is a product of embracing a faulty understanding of certain important aspects of actual scientific practice. Those misunderstandings are mutually reinforcing with a widely held commitment to a suspect conception of our perceptual systems. This paper spells out the role these errors play in the philosophical literature on color and exposes their failings.

SERVICE

Department - CSULB

Various routine departmental and graduate student committees
Undergraduate Advisor (2007-2008)
Tenure-Track Search Committee (2005-2006, 2006-2007, 2007-2008)
Masters Degree Exam Committee (Chair), “Kant on Space and Time” (2006)

Department - WUSTL

Honors Thesis Committee, “Making Rape an Impotent Weapon of War” (2004)

University - CSULB

Program Review Committee, Department of Economics (2006-2007)
Faculty Council (2007-2008)
Faculty Hearing Panel (2007-Present)

Profession

Reviewed book proposals for Acumen Publishers and Oxford University Press
Referee for *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition*, *Cognitive Systems Research*, *Inquiry*, *Philosophical Psychology*, *Synthese*
Session Chair, Empathy – An International Interdisciplinary Conference, California State University, Fullerton (2006)
Session Chair, Virtue and Vice: Moral and Intellectual – An International Interdisciplinary Conference, California State University, Fullerton (2008)

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division
Philosophy of Science Association

NONACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT

Solutions Engineer

Action Technologies – Northeast US Territory
April 2001 – June 2003

Sales Engineer

NextiraOne (formerly Williams Communications) – CTI Lab, Woodbridge, NJ
June 1999 – April 2001